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ABSTRACT
The rise of the internet age and the exponential advance of technology is
rapidly and dramatically changing all aspects of our world. The money
transmission industry is no exception to this trend; however, Idaho’s Money
Transmitters Act was enacted before the implications of these changes
were apparent and thus was not designed with the ability to adapt to them.
This technological change has also highlighted the problems with the Balkanized state of interstate money transmitter regulation. This article attempts to address the problems with Idaho’s current Money Transmitters
Act and with the Balkanized national regulatory landscape governing
money transmitters resulting from technological change. This article proposes three main changes to address these problems: centralizing regulatory and licensing authority of money transmitters in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or implementing interstate licensing reciprocity,
matching the degree of regulation to the degree of risk of consumer loss a
given entity represents, and finally adopting definitions and statutory language which more broadly conceptualizes the actors and activities involved
in money transmission. The goal of these changes is not only to create effective money transmitter licensing regulation for the current state of affairs, but also to enable such regulation to remain effective in the face of
the unending and unpredictable changes wrought by technological advancement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Money transmitter acts, including Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act (the “Idaho
Act” or “Act”), provide for the licensing of entities that engage in the transmission
of money, with the purpose of protecting citizens. 1 Money transmitters are playing
an increasingly important role in the daily life of the average American, with “[o]ver
1.

E.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 2030(a) (West 2018); IDAHO CODE § 26-2903(1) (2018).
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one-quarter of U.S. households” using services from such entities. 2 Furthermore,
the financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated that even established financial institutions
involved in money transmission can fail, 3 and thus regulations to appropriately minimize the risk of failure and consumer loss are a necessary safeguard to maintain
consumers’ trust in the money transmission industry.
Money transmitter acts were designed with traditional money transmitters,
like Western Union, in mind. 4 However, because the rapid emergence of new technologies has changed the actors and activities involved in money transmission, 5
these money transmitter acts need to be updated to continue serving their purpose.
In addition, because much of the innovation affecting money transmission is centered around internet-based technologies, which are almost inherently multistate
in nature, 6 the challenges created by the Balkanized national regulatory landscape
governing money transmitters are brought into increasingly sharp relief. 7 These
challenges include stifled innovation, over and under-inclusive regulation, and increasingly ineffective protection for citizens who use money transmission services. 8
New technology often has a disruptive effect on the industries in which it is
adopted, and the money transmission industry is not exempt from this trend. 9 Technological innovations have introduced new actors and activities into the industry. 10

2. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N, THE STATE OF
STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES REGULATION & SUPERVISION 3 (2016); Courtney J. Linn, One-hour Money Laundering: Prosecuting Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J.
138, 178 (2007) [hereinafter One-hour Money Laundering] (“[P]repaid cards have emerged as a means of
delivering financial services to a large segment of the population that is either not served or underserved
by traditional banks.”).
3. See PHILIP KEITEL, INSOLVENCY RISK IN THE NETWORK-BRANDED PREPAID-CARD VALUE CHAIN at 1, 21
(Sept. 2011) (discussing the failure of banks in 2009 and 2010 which had issued prepaid cards and the general risk of insolvency of such entities).
4. Benjamin Lo, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments
Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 112–13 (2016) [hereinafter Fatal Fragments].
5. Dong He et al., IMF, Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, SDN/16/03, at 5
(2016); Debra Walton, Technology is Disrupting the Way People Earn, Save and Spend. How Should Banks
Respond?, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/technology-is-disrupting-finance-how-should-leaders-respond/; see M. MacRae Robinson, Easing the Burden on Mobile Payments: Resolving Current Deficiencies in Money Transmitter Regulation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 553, 554–56
(2014) [hereinafter Easing the Burden].
6. See Kevin V. Tu., Regulating the New Cashless World, 65 ALA. L. REV. 77, 80 (2013) [hereinafter
New Cashless World] (internet payment systems are increasingly important); Fatal Fragments, supra note
4, at 112–13.
7. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 117–20.
8. Id. at 119; see Lalita Clozel, When Will Fintech Regulation Grow Up?, AM. BANKER (Oct. 5, 2016,
6:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/when-will-fintech-regulation-grow-up.
9. Ron Miller, Technology is Disrupting Everything, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/16/technology-is-disrupting-everything/; Walton, supra note 5.
10. Easing the Burden, supra note 5; see New Cashless World, supra note 6. One clear example
is the emergence of virtual currencies like Bitcoin, which rely on blockchain technology to function, which
in turn relies on the internet. Ritchie S. King et al., By Reading This Article, You’re Mining Bitcoins, QUARTZ
(Dec. 17, 2013), https://qz.com/154877/by-reading-this-page-you-are-mining-bitcoins/.
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Moreover, technological changes that are not directly related to money transmission, including artificial intelligence (“AI”), 11 are likely to have a major impact on the
industry in the near future.
In response to these new technologies, some states have been quick to amend
their existing money transmitter regulations. 12 Idaho, however, has failed to make
any substantive changes to the Idaho Act, 13 resulting in its obsolescence. While the
Idaho Department of Finance has extended the Idaho Act to regulate some new
technologies, 14 the current problems will continue to grow as new technology continues to emerge and as present technology achieves wider acceptance.
In addition to the issues directly presented by new technology, the current
Idaho Act contributes to the Balkanized national regulatory landscape governing
money transmitters. This morass of regulatory confusion discourages new companies from obtaining licenses and, to the extent new companies seek to comply, inhibits innovation by creating large barriers to entry. 15 The Uniform Law Commission
has attempted to rectify this Balkanization through the Uniform Money Services Act
(“UMSA”), but the UMSA has not yet been widely adopted. 16
This article proposes two solutions to address these issues. The principal solution proposed is the implementation of a unified federal regulatory scheme which
would preempt state-level regulation and be administered by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Alternatively, this article proposes several amendments to the existing Idaho Act designed to alleviate the issues created by the Balkanized regulatory landscape and to make the Idaho Act friendlier to new and innovative money transmitters, while continuing to serve the policy goal of protecting
citizens.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part II provides a brief history of the Idaho
Money Transmitters Act and the policies underlying it as well as a comparison to
the policies underlying similar regulation in other states and at the federal level.
Part III discusses the new technologies that are impacting the field of money transmission. Part IV discusses the implications and effects of such technologies on
11. I use the term AI to include all manner of artificial intelligences and machine learning. For a
good discussion of different levels and types of artificial intelligence, see Artificial Intelligence in the Practice
of Law: An Analysis and Proof of Concept Experiment. Daniel Ben-Ari et al., Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proof of Concept Experiment, 23 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 3 (2017).
12. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.055 (West 2018) (specific regulation of online currency exchangers); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.370 (West 2018) (disclosure requirements for virtual currency licenses); Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 125 (discussing New York’s implementation of a virtual
currency regulatory framework).
13. See IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018) (no changes to the Act relating to changes in technology since its inception).
14. See Idaho Money Transmitters Section, IDAHO DEP’T FIN., https://www.finance.idaho.gov/who-we-regulate/money-transmitters/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (stating that exchangers of virtual currency are regulated money transmitters).
15. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 133–35 (licensing in the five most populous states
would require over $1 million in surety bonds, an upfront cost of about $180,000, and annual costs of
$140,000); Tim Fernholz, The Patchwork of Regulations Entangling Square, and Every American Internet
Startup that Takes Money, QUARTZ (Mar. 14, 2013), https://qz.com/62265/why-square-and-seven-other-finance-start-ups-got-run-out-of-illinois/.
16. See Money Services Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N (last visited Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=cf8b649a-114c-4bc9-8937-c4ee17148a1b (indicating that the Uniform Money Services Act has only been enacted by a handful of States and territories).
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money transmission and the regulation thereof. Part V provides an overview of the
current Idaho Act. Part VI reviews other states’ money transmission regulations, the
Uniform Money Services Act, and current federal regulations. Drawing from the
previous parts, Part VII analyzes the problems with the current Idaho Act and proposes several solutions.
II. THE HISTORY AND UNDERLYING POLICIES OF MONEY TRANSMITTER
REGULATION
An understanding of the history of the Idaho Act and the policies underlying it
and similar regulation is necessary to appreciate the problems that new technologies present.
A. The History and Policies of Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act
Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act was enacted in 1994 with the purpose of protecting Idaho’s citizens from insolvent or fraudulent money transmitter businesses. 17 Consistent with this purpose, the Idaho Department of Treasury has ordered money transmitters to cease operation upon the determinations that (1) the
transmitter appeared to be acting in a fraudulent manner such that it constituted
“an immediate danger to the public” and (2) the order was “necessary for the protection of the public.” 18
Since its original enactment, the Idaho Act has only been amended a few
times. 19 The most recent substantive change occurred in 2005, when Section 262915 was expanded slightly to require money transmitters to create and retain records required by other federal and state anti-money laundering laws. 20 This amendment indicated a legislative willingness to use the Idaho Act as a tool in the fight
against illegal money laundering, especially as it relates to terrorism. 21
In addition to enacting its own regulation, Idaho is a member of the Money
Transmitter Regulators Association (MTRA). 22 The MTRA is an organization of member states with the primary goal of making interstate money transmitter regulation
more efficient. 23 The MTRA Cooperative Agreement provides a framework for the
17. 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 410.
18. See, e.g., Order to Cease and Desist, at 6, State of Idaho v. Strong Funds, Inc., 2006-12-02
(Idaho Dep’t of Treasury Dec. 11, 2006) (order for company holding itself out as a licensed money transmitter in Idaho to cease operation since it was not actually licensed).
19. See H.B. 72, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1999) (updating § 26-2906); H.B. 75, 58th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005) (updating §§ 26-2914–2915, 26-2917); H.B. 91, 63d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2015) (updating § 26-2916).
20. See H.B. 75, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005) (updating §§ 26-2914–2915, 26-2917).
21. H.B. 75, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2005).
22. Members, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N, https://www.mtraweb.org/about/members/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (listing Idaho as a member State).
23. Article 2: Statement of Purpose, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N,
https://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperative-agreement/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). It is worth noting
that the mere existence of such an organization, having over fifty member states and U.S. territories, indicates that interstate money transmitter regulation is problematic.
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interaction of states “that have concurrent jurisdiction over a regulated entity.” 24
While the agreement identifies a “lead state” for overseeing a given transmitter,
the lead state’s role is merely to “assist state supervisors in fulfilling their own regulatory responsibilities.” 25 Further, the agreement does not create any type of reciprocal licensing agreement. 26 While the Cooperative Agreement facilities coordination of money transmitter regulation enforcement, it adds another layer of regulatory complexity and fails to mitigate the underlying Balkanization of the national
regulatory landscape governing money transmitters.
B. The Underlying Policies of Money Transmitter Regulation in Other States and
Federally
Almost every other state has enacted money transmitter regulation similar to
Idaho’s Money Transmitter Act. 27 However, the purposes underlying other states’
regulations vary and sometimes even conflict. 28 For example, California’s underlying policy of protecting “the interests of consumers of money transmission businesses in [California]” may conflict with New York’s underlying policy of fostering
“the growth of the financial industry in New York.” 29 A money transmitter with a
new and risky business model that would expand the financial industry in New York
may be allowed to operate there pursuant to the state’s aforementioned policy.
However, that same money transmitter may not be allowed to operate in California
due to the risk it poses to consumers. Such variations in policy further exacerbate
the difficulty of creating a cohesive regulatory landscape as various state legislatures seek to achieve different ends with the same type of regulation.
At the federal level, the focus of money transmitter regulation has traditionally been on preventing money laundering. 30 The principal regulations governing
money transmitters at the federal level are contained within the Bank Secrecy Act

24. Id.
TRANSMITTER
REGULATORS
ASS’N,
25. Section
2.2
Responsibilities,
MONEY
https://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperative-agreement/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). See also Article 6:
Applicable Laws, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N, https://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperativeagreement/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (explicitly stating that the laws of each with jurisdiction over an
entity may not be waived).
26. See Article 6: Applicable Laws, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N,
https://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperative-agreement/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019); Article 7: Application, MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATORS ASS’N, https://www.mtraweb.org/about/cooperative-agreement/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2019) (explicitly stating that each state will retain authority of licensing application approval).
27. See Thomas Brown, 50-State Survey: Money Transmitter Licensing Requirements,
http://abnk.assembly.ca.gov/sites/abnk.assembly.ca.gov/files/50%20State%20Survey%20%20MTL%20Licensing%20Requirements(72986803_4).pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [hereinafter 50-STATE
SURVEY]; Money Services Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=cf8b649a-114c-4bc9-8937-c4ee17148a1b (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (listing 12
states and U.S. territories that have adopted the Uniform Money Services Act).
28. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 117–18 (identifying consumer protection, money laundering prevention, and protection of the financial service industry among the policy reasons underlying their
regulation).
29. CAL. FIN. CODE § 2001(d) (West 2018); N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 201(b)(1) (McKinney 2018).
30. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 114; 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012).
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(BSA), which is enforced by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). 31
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government increased focus on
financial regulation protecting consumers, as evidenced by the establishment of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the implementation other financial regulations. 32
III. NEW AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY CHANGING MONEY TRANSMISSION
To have a meaningful discussion about the problems with the current Idaho
Act caused or highlighted by certain new technologies, a basic understanding of
those technologies is required. The proliferation of computers and the rise of the
internet underlie the technologies that currently have, or present the greatest potential to have, the most disruptive effect on the money transmission industry. This
article focuses on several of these technologies while recognizing that other technologies that do not seem important now may have a dramatic impact in the future.
A. Blockchain
The technology with perhaps the greatest potential to disrupt the current
money transmission industry is blockchain-based technology. 33 A blockchain is essentially an immutable distributed ledger that eliminates the need for trust in transactions. 34 It is blockchain’s ability to remove the need for trust from transactions
that makes the technology valuable. 35 Blockchain technology thus impacts money
transmission, among other ways, by allowing new forms of currency and by fundamentally changing the manner in which entities using the technology can be effectively regulated. 36

31. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 114–15; 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2)(I) (2012) (charging FinCEN
with administering the BSA).
32. E.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 15 U.S.C. §
1693 (2012); see Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/the-bureau/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
33. This is based on the fact that blockchain technology has not only already caused disruption,
but also that, like the internet, it has the potential to be a “foundational technology.” Marco Iansiti & Karim
R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, 95 HARV. BUS. REV. 118, 120 (2017).
34. See Nolan Bauerle, What is Blockchain Technology, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
35. TEDx Talks, Blockchain: Massively Simplified | Richie Etwaru | TEDxMorristown, YOUTUBE
(May 15, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k53LU ZxUF50 [hereinafter TEDx Talks] (starting at
4:35).
36. See Madhvi Mavadiya, Blockchain, Bitcoin and Ethereum Explained, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2017,
9:00AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/madhvimavadiya/2017/08/22/blockchain-bitcoinethereum/
#6ff762b76df9 (discussing the importance of blockchain technology’s removal of intermediaries); Marco A.
Santori, Governor Jack Markell Announces Delaware Blockchain Initiative, GLOBALDELAWARE (June 10, 2016),
https://global.delaware.gov/2016/06/10/delaware-to-create-distributed-ledger-based-share-ownershipstructure-as-part-of-blockchain-initiative/ (discussing the possibility of blockchain based technologies eliminating all intermediaries in the validation and settlement of transactions).

346

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 55

Perhaps the most well-known implementations of blockchain technology are
blockchain-based virtual currencies. 37 The most popular of these currencies is
Bitcoin. 38 These virtual currencies have become increasingly popular and have
started to see mainstream acceptance as a form of currency. 39 Both individuals and
large companies are starting to invest in virtual currencies. 40 The increasing interest
has also spawned a veritable tsunami of different blockchain-based currencies. 41
Some are similar to Bitcoin, 42 while others, like STEEM or Ethereum, have purposes
beyond merely serving as a currency. 43
In addition to blockchain-based virtual currencies, another blockchain-based
technology implicating money transmitter regulation is the smart contract. A smart
contract is “computer code that can facilitate the exchange of . . . anything of
value,” which, “when running on the blockchain . . . becomes like a self-operating
computer program that automatically executes when specific conditions are
met.” 44 These smart contracts enable the creation and execution of decentralized
applications that can serve an almost unlimited number of functions. 45 One of the
most promising applications of smart contracts for money transmitter regulation is
the automation of regulatory compliance through the ability of all entities utilizing
the same blockchain network to validate and report on transactions occurring over

37. Many articles have been written discussing blockchain based virtual currency. See, e.g., Sarah
Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments
Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495 (2015); Jacob Hamburger, Bitcoins vs. State Money Transmission Laws:
Protecting Consumers or Hindering Innovation?, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 229 (2015); James Gatto & Elsa S.
Broeker, Bitcoin and Beyond: Current and Future Regulation of Virtual Currencies, 9 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 429
(2015).
38. DAVID LEE KUO CHUEN, HANDBOOK OF DIGITAL CURRENCY: BITCOIN, INNOVATION, FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS, AND BIG DATA 310 (2015).
39. Sean Williams, 5 Brand-Name Businesses that Currently Accept Bitcoin, THE MOTLEY FOOL (July
6, 2017, 7:41AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/07/06/5-brand-name-businesses-that-currentlyaccept-bitc.aspx (noting that overstock.com, DISH Network, Microsoft, Intuit, and Paypal accept bitcoins for
payment).
40. Kazuaki Nagata, Booming Cryptocurrencies Fire Up Investment Interest, THE JAPAN TIMES (Aug.
20, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/20/business/virtual-currencies-enjoy-investment-boom-consumers-hesitate/#.WgjRYWiPKUk.
41. Prableen Bajpai, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other than Bitcoin, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/tech/most-important-cryptocurrencies-other-than-bitcoin/ (last updated
Feb. 9, 2019) (noting that there were over 700 different cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin).
42. See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOINCASH, https://www.bitcoincash.org/#faq (last visited
Mar. 24, 2019) (describing Bitcoin Cash as “peer-to-peer electronic cash” which is separate from Bitcoin).
43. See STEEM Bluepaper: A Protocol for Enabling Smart, Social Currency for Publishers and Content Businesses Across the Internet, STEEMIT, INC. 1 (2017), https://steem.io/steem-bluepaper.pdf (describing
a blockchain based currency aimed at encouraging social media engagement and monetizing online content); Ethereum Blockchain App Platform, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/ (last visited Mar. 24,
2019) (blockchain based virtual currency aimed at facilitating the operation and use of the Ethereum network—a decentralized platform for smart contracts).
44. What Is Ethereum? A Step-by-Step Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-ethereum/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
45. Id.
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the network. 46 The automation of regulatory compliance validation could dramatically decrease the risk of fraud to consumers by enabling regulators, both government and those within a company, to automatically be notified of potential regulatory violations.
The smart contracts concept can be extended to create a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) operating on the blockchain. 47 “A DAO is [a] fully autonomous, decentralized organization” that is “run by programming code, on a collection of smart contracts written on the . . . blockchain. The code is designed to replace the rules and structure of a traditional organization, eliminating the need for
people and centralized control.” 48 A DAO may even operate independently of its
original creators. 49 The projects on which a DAO works are generally determined by
a vote of those who have bought into the DAO; however, these people do not necessarily own the DAO itself. 50 Instead, those who have bought in generally have a
claim to a certain output product. 51 The net result is that there is no clear owner or
party responsible for a given DAO. 52
B. Prepaid Payment Mechanisms
Providers of prepaid payment mechanisms, like gift cards and Visa prepaid
cards, are generally considered to fall within the purview of money transmitter regulation at the state level. 53 However, the breadth of entities considered to be such
a provider is expanding as new prepaid payment mechanisms are developed. Moreover, as prepaid mechanisms become increasingly important to Americans, 54 ensuring that the issuers of such mechanisms are appropriately regulated to protect
consumers also becomes increasingly important.

46. This could be achieved two ways. First, by requiring that money transmitters utilizing the
network build regulatory compliance into their smart contracts. Second, by creating a regulatory compliance monitoring algorithm which automatically monitors entities acting on the blockchain network and reports violations to the regulatory agency.
47. What Is Ethereum? A Step-by-Step Beginners Guide, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The process of buying into a DAO, which is generally done via participation in the structure
or a contribution into such a DAO, has been found to essentially constitute a securities offering, and thus
may be subject to regulation under securities law. Timothy B. Lee, Using a Blockchain Doesn’t Exempt You
from Securities Regulations, ARSTECHNICA (July 26, 2017, 1:40PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/07/using-a-blockchain-doesnt-exempt-you-from-securities-regulations/.
51. This claim would arise through the common law of contracts.
52. See Nick Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How Web 3.0 Will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 135, 140–42 (2015) (discussing DOAs and noting the potential lack of liable
parties for copyright infringement in the context of a decentralized internet).
53. See New Cashless World, supra note 6, at 103 (noting that issuers of stored value that may
be used to make purchases at merchants other than the issuer are subject to regulation).
54. One-hour Money Laundering, supra note 2 (“[P]repaid cards have emerged as a means of
delivering financial services to a large segment of the population that is either not served or underserved
by traditional banks.”).
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One of the newest forms of a prepaid payment mechanism is the digital wallet. 55 An example of this is Google Wallet:
[W]hen the customer agrees to purchase a good. . . a payments solution
provider under contract with Google . . . issues a onetime, prepaid, virtual
MasterCard debit card for the amount of the transaction. Google Wallet
debits the single use card and transfers that amount to the merchant and
subsequently debits the same amount from the customer's bank account
that is stored in Google Wallet. 56
Similarly, Apple has introduced a peer-to-peer (P2P) payment system that relies on prepaid mechanisms. 57
Venmo is another example of a digital wallet which constitutes a prepaid
mechanism. 58 In addition to being able to debit and credit a user’s bank account,
Venmo holds currency received from others in a user’s account until the customer
requests that the funds be transferred to a bank, to a merchant, or to another person using the service. 59
Both these new takes on prepaid payment mechanisms and more traditional
iterations are subject to increasing regulation at the federal level. 60 This increasing
regulation sits atop the myriad regulations already imposed on prepaid payment
mechanisms by several different federal agencies. 61
C. Payment Processors
The current Idaho Act applies to payment processors, a category of financial
entities experiencing significant change as a result of new technologies. 62 The rise
of the internet and other technologies have allowed new service providers to “facilitate consumer-to-merchant payments” in commercial transactions. 63 These new
providers “typically underwrite the payment to the merchant, then later withdraw
the money from the consumer's bank account or charge the consumer's credit
55. Easing the Burden, supra note 5.
56. Id. at 556.
57. Fitz Tepper, You Can Now Send Your Friends Money Inside iMessage, TECHCRUNCH (June 5,
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/05/you-can-now-send-your-friends-money-inside-imessage/.
58. See How It Works, VENMO, https://venmo.com/about/product (last visited Mar. 24, 2019)
(Venmo allows users to pay anyone instantly “using money you have in Venmo”).
59. See Purchase Funding Sources – Venmo, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/217532317-Purchase-Funding-Sources (last updated Mar. 23, 2019) (Venmo funds transactions from
the balance in your Venmo account).
60. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PREPAID RULE: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE 1 (2017); Gillian
B. White, The New Rules of Digital Cash, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/cfpb-prepaid-venmo/503000/ (noting that the new CFPB rules will impact Venmo and other
digital entities).
61. “Currently, five agencies - the Federal Reserve System, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) - all have some responsibility in overseeing the regulation of the mobile
payments business.” Easing the Burden, supra note 5, at 558. “[T]he CFPB and the FTC currently assume
concurrent responsibility of consumer protection.” Id. at 559.
62. See Idaho Money Transmitters Section, supra note 14 (stating that payment processors are
regulated as money transmitters).
63. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 122.
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card.” 64 By underwriting the payments, these providers decrease the risk to the
merchant of non-payment and the risk to the payor of the payment processor absconding with their money. Further, these new providers have driven down the cost
of payment processing services while making them easier to access and use. 65
D. Incidental Transmitters 66
A result of the internet making money transmission easier is that more entities
have started engaging in money transmission in the course of providing goods or
services, and thus the transmission is incidental to their core business. 67 This category encompasses some of the largest internet-based companies, including Amazon.com, Uber, and AirBnB. 68 While federal law excludes such entities, 69 Idaho’s Act
does not contain a similar exemption. 70
E. Artificial Intelligence
The last principal technology considered by this article is AI. AI creates the
possibility that humans will be entirely removed from the process of creating and
operating a money transmitter. 71 While AI technology is not yet so advanced, limited implementations of artificially intelligent learning algorithms, also known as
machine learning, are beginning to see widespread adoption in other financial industries. 72

64. Id.
65. See id. (noting that payment processor “startups provide easy-to-use software and hardware
that allow small businesses to receive payment from consumers.”); Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The
Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 481 (2007) (PayPal
has reduced the transaction costs of processing payments compared to traditional networks).
66. I have adopted this term from Benjamin Lo and his discussion of them in Fatal Fragments:
The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments Innovation. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at
121–22.
67. Id.
68. See id. (discussing how online market platforms which “connect buyers and sellers of goods
and services . . . usually offer a native payment function to help sellers get paid”).
69. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(B) (2017).
70. See IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018).
71. Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for
Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 451 (“Within a matter of time, computers and software programs will essentially act as independent, autonomous artificial
agents.”).
72. See Daniel Ben-Ari et al., Artificial Intelligence in the Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proof
of Concept Experiment, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 28 (2017); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV.
678, 689–93 (2013) (discussing the use of algorithm-based trading and asset management rising rapidly in
prominence).
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IV. HOW THESE NEW TECHNOLOGIES STRAIN THE EXISTING MONEY TRANSMITTER
REGULATION
Whereas the implications of some of these technologies on the money transmission industry and consequently on its regulation may be clear, it is worth further
exploring some of the specific issues that these technologies operating independently and together present.
A. Implications of the Rise of the Internet
Looking at internet-based technologies more generally, their rise has created
a money transmitter landscape that is no longer geographically bounded. The internet has enabled companies to offer money transmission services even when they
are not physically present in Idaho. By removing such restrictions, internet-based
entities have less incentive to meet the high regulatory burden imposed by the current Act because a digital presence is more difficult to regulate than a physical presence, 73 especially when the entities are new. 74 Moreover, the relatively small population of Idaho likely dis-incentivizes those entities that might otherwise comply
with Idaho’s licensing requirements from providing services to the jurisdiction due
to the regulatory burden. Further, this regulatory burden may incentivize entities
to attempt to operate under the radar of Idaho’s Department of Treasury until they
have a sufficient customer base to offset the regulatory costs of obtaining a license. 75
This is especially true when considering the Idaho Act’s regulation of prepaid
payment mechanisms. As discussed above, new actors are starting to become involved in the issuance of prepaid payment mechanisms because of new technology—in particular, the rise of the internet. As such mechanisms become more important to Idaho’s citizens, 76 the redundant regulations imposed by the Idaho Act

73. These difficulties arise both from jurisdictional problems and from the inability of regulators
to punish those who violate the law when they have no assets within the physical territory of the state. See
Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs”, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129,
1188 (2015) (positing the hypothetical difficulties of a U.S. citizen recovering on a judgement from a U.S.
court against a hacker in Iran for harm the hacker caused). See generally Teresa Scassa & Robert J. Currie,
New First Principles? Assessing the Internet’s Challenges to Jurisdiction, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1017 (2011) (discussing the challenges posed to establishing jurisdiction across international borders over activities and actors on the internet).
74. See Tim Fernholz, The Patchwork of Regulation Entangling Square, and Every American Internet Startup that Takes Money, QUARTZ (Mar. 14, 2013), https://qz.com/62265/why-square-and-sevenother-finance-start-ups-got-run-out-of-illinois/.
75. Such evasion has occurred with business that have become very successful, such as Square.
See Ingrid Lunden, Square Fined $507K In Florida For Operating A Mobile Payment Service Without A Money
Transmitter License, TECHCRUCH (Aug. 16, 2013), https://techcrunch.com/2013/08/16/square-fined-507kin-florida-for-operating-a-mobile-payment-service-without-a-money-transmitter-license/; see also General
DIV.
CORP.,
https://icis.corp.delaware.gov/ecorp/enInformation
Name
Search,
DEL.
titysearch/NameSearch.aspx (search “4699855” in the “File Number:” box and then click “SQUARE, INC.”
under “ENTITY NAME”) (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (indicating that Square was incorporated in 2009).
76. See Sarah Glenn, More Idahoans Have Bank Accounts, but Underbanked Population Soars,
IDAHO ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/news/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-
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will become an increasingly inconvenient and burdensome barrier to beneficial innovation for Idaho’s citizens.
B. Implications of Blockchain-Based Technology Itself and in Conjunction with
Artificial Intelligence
As noted above, blockchain-based technologies have already had an impact
on the money transmission industry and are poised to have an even greater transformative effect. There are several notable ways that blockchain technologies
themselves, or in combination with other technologies, are straining—or are poised
to strain—the existing regulatory framework. 77
One of the most readily apparent effects of blockchain-based technologies is
the rise of virtual currencies. 78 As these virtual currencies see greater acceptance,
it becomes more likely that they will constitute a substantial asset to a given individual. The result is that the current Act will be less effective at protecting Idaho’s
citizens’ assets that have substantially the same, if not more, value to them as traditional currencies. This diminished effectiveness arises from the Act’s failure to
regulate transmissions involving only virtual currencies and the more volatile nature
of such currencies. 79
Blockchain technologies present the possibility of radically changing the actors
involved in money transmission. 80 The most immediate of these changes to the actors involved is that the intermediaries facilitating money transmission transactions
no longer need to be human. 81 Instead, an automated algorithm operating on the
blockchain may soon be the only relevant actor involved in the actual transmission. 82 Moreover, such transactions are inherently transparent to anyone on the
2004&rft_id=info%3Asid/ifoweb.newbank.com&svc_dat=AMNEWS&req_dat=2D945D1F48F94F9BAB3FED5084ADC164&rft_val_format=info%
3Aofi/fmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Actx&rft_dat=document_id%3Anews%252F1606207177D67AB8/zone%3A.
77. See Iansiti, supra note 33, at 120 (noting that blockchain based technologies will require
changes to regulation for their full benefit to be realized).
78. See Sean Williams, supra note 39; Ken Yagami, Japan: A Forward Thinking Bitcoin Nation,
FORBES (Nov. 2, 2017, 5:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/outofasia/2017/11/02/japan-a-forwardthinking-bitcoin-nation/#1f4aaf4233a3 (discussing how Japan has become the first nation to amend its laws
“to allow ‘virtual currencies’ as a legal form of payment”).
79. See Joel Comm, Coping with BitCoin’s Volatility, FORBES (Nov. 5, 2017, 8:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbescoachescouncil/2017/11/05/coping-with-bitcoins-volatility/#40a7f20d62ec.
80. See TEDx Talks, supra note 35 (discussing how blockchain removes the need for intermediaries); Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Dir., Central Banking and Fintech – A Brave New World? (Sep. 29,
2017),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/28/sp092917-central-banking-and-fintech-abrave-new-world.
81. See TEDX TALKS, supra note 35 (the automated blockchain algorithm executes transaction
without human involvement).
82. See id. Recognition must be given to the fact that there is an element of human control since
changes can generally be made to the blockchain network protocol with minimal disruption by a consensus
of at least 51% of the computing power operating the blockchain. Alyssa Hertig, Why are Miners Involved in
Bitcoin Code Changes Anyway?, COINDESK (Jul. 28, 2017, 3:05 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/miners-involved-bitcoin-code-changes-anyway/. However, this decentralized control effectively regulates those
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blockchain network. 83 Thus, by effectively removing the human component while
at the same time increasing the transparency of those engaging in money transmission, the risk posed by such transmitters is reduced significantly. An example of a
successful implementation of blockchain technology in the financial sector can be
found in IBM’s use of the technology in their capital financing operation, which is
worth $48 billion a year. 84 Due “to a comprehensive view of operational data from
purchase orders to remittances consolidated and distributed to all parties,” IBM
decreased its dispute amount from $100 million at a given time to $30 million and
decreased its dispute resolution time by about 75%. 85 The current Act is unable to
appropriately respond in a standard way to this very low risk actor, instead imposing
the same licensing requirements as are imposed on all transmitters. 86 A separate
implication of this technological potential is that the regulatory focus of entities
properly employing such technology should switch from the transaction records
themselves (since any tampering with those would be easily spotted by a properly
developed validation algorithm) 87 to the validation algorithm itself.
Another implication of blockchain technology is that the decentralized and
anonymized nature of some implementations of the technology may result in the
inability of any one entity to fully report all of the transactions occurring across a
network. 88 Individuals may have access to the whole transaction ledger for the
chain, but the information identifying specific parties can be anonymized—thereby
severely restricting or eliminating the ability of a given individual on a blockchain to
tie any particular transaction to any particular individual. 89 The result is that even
though the ledgers of the actor are completely transparent, full compliance with
the current Act’s records requirements may be impracticable. 90

seeking to abuse the blockchain because the number of bad actors on the chain would need to constitute
at least 51% and, because abuse of the blockchain would likely devalue the currency, there are strong disincentives against malicious abuse. The result is that the risk lies with the entities providing the “wallet” or
end-user services because the same difficulties and disincentives do not apply.
83. What Is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last updated Mar. 1, 2019). Transparent
here means that anyone with control over or access to a node on the blockchain performing transaction
validation functions (i.e. holding a copy of the distributed ledger and checking transactions against it) will
generally be able to see at least the basic information about a given transaction. See id.
84. Kamil Gregor, IBM Wants to Make 2017 the Year of 2017 Blockchain Enterprise Deployment,
IDC 3–4 (April 2017) https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/in-en/assets/IDC_Report__IBM_wants_to_make_2
017_the_year_of_BlockChain_Enterprise__Deployment.pdf (discussing IBM’s use of blockchain technology
in the resolution of financing disputes).
85. Id. at 4.
86. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2904 (2018) (does not contain exemption for low risk entities); IDAHO
CODE § 26-2905(1) (2018) (applying the same net worth requirements for all transmitters as a condition of
licensing); IDAHO CODE § 26-2908 (2018) (applying the same bond requirements to all transmitters as a condition of licensing). The net worth requirements may become inapplicable when the only entity engaged in
the transaction is the automated algorithm, because it does not need the assets of a traditional business.
87. See What Is Ethereum? A Step-by-Step Beginners Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-ethereum/ (last updated Sept. 12, 2018).
88. See What Is Cryptocurrency: Everything You Need to Know [Ultimate Guide], BLOCKGEEKS,
https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-cryptocurrency/ (last updated Sept. 13, 2018).
89. Id.
90. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2914(1) (2018).
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Blockchain technology also creates the foundation for DAOs, which have the
potential to perform money transmission activities requiring a license but lack any
clearly identifiable party responsible for obtaining one. Situations could arise where
a DAO acts as a payment processor by processing payments from clients to its members or where a DAO issues stored value cards that may be used to purchase goods
or services from any of the DAO’s members. In either scenario, because the money
transmission activity occurs via smart contracts and the only “persons” party to the
transaction are end users, 91 it is unlikely that any party in a given transaction would
be “controlling” or otherwise liable. 92
A more radical and more distant possible change built on blockchain technology is the creation of DAO that operates via an AI. Imagine this scenario: A DAO is
created to enable P2P transactions, which is governed by an AI who creates the
rules of the blockchain supporting the DAO and make changes as necessary to further its goal of enabling P2P transactions. In the course of executing a smart contract between two people, one in State X and the other in State Y to transfer real
currency the AI determines that the most efficient routing is via a node in Idaho that
a person has put on the network. This person has made his or her computing power
available to the network without knowing exactly how it will be used. Assuming the
transmission is a violation of the Act, who is responsible for getting the DAO licensed? It was created only to enable P2P transactions but not specifically currency
transactions. Further, there is no individual or easily definable group controlling the
entity. The current Act does not provide a clear answer, and situations like this may
not be that far off in the future. 93
C. Implications of the Increase in Incidental Transmitters
One final implication of emerging technology to consider is that the current
Idaho Act applies to entities that the drafters of the Act likely would not have intended to cover. 94 Entities like incidental transmitters, which generally present a
low risk of loss to consumers, 95 are required to be licensed as money transmitters

Act).

91.

See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(15) (2018) (definition of “person” for the purpose of the Idaho

92. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(15) (2018) (defining “person” under the Act). See generally Nick
Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How Web 3.0 Will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
136, 142 (2015) (discussing the problems with liability for copyright infringement in the context of a decentralized internet).
93. See Falguni Desai, The Age of Artificial Intelligence in Fintech, FORBES (June 30, 2016, 10:42
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/06/30/the-age-of-artificial-intelligence-in-fintec
h/#181a24335028 (artificial intelligence in financial technologies is becoming increasingly prevalent); Paul
Vigna ET AL., Goldman Sachs Explores a New World: Trading Bitcoin, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 2, 2017, 8:00 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldman-sachs-explores-a-new-world-trading-bitcoin-1506959128 (Goldman Sachs, one of the companies employing AI in fintech, is exploring expansion into blockchain based
virtual currencies); Trent McConaghy, AI DAOs, and Three Paths to Get There, BIGCHAINDB (June 18, 2016),
https://blog.bigchaindb.com/ai-daos-and-three-paths-to-get-there-cfa0a4cc37b8 (discussing how DAOs
operated by AIs may work).
94. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 122.
95. See id. (incidental transmitters generally present a lower risk of loss to consumers).
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even though their transmission activities are merely incidental to their core business. 96 Companies like Uber and AirBnB fill a need as evidenced by their rapid
growth and adoption. 97 However, the benefits provided by such companies may be
slower to reach Idaho consumers due to the regulations imposed on such entities
and the decreased incentive to serve a state with a smaller population.
V. OVERVIEW OF IDAHO’S MONEY TRANSMITTERS ACT
With a basic understanding in place of some of the key technologies creating
problems for or highlighting existing problems of the Idaho Act, this article now focuses on the provisions of the current Idaho Act implicated by such problems.
A. Relevant Provisions of the Idaho Money Transmitters Act
i. Key Definitions in the Current Act
Several key definitions in the Idaho Money Transmitters Act establish the
scope of the Act and provide insight into its drafters’ conceptualizations regarding
money transmitters and money transmission. Understanding each of these definitions is necessary to understanding the problems with the current Act.
The most problematic definition is how the Idaho Act defines “money transmission.” This definition sets the outer bounds of the Act’s applicability. 98 The definition has three components: activities, locations, and means. 99 The activities covered are “the sale or issuance of payments systems,” 100 “engaging in the business
of receiving money for transmission,” and “the business of transmitting money.” 101
The locations covered include any origination point within the United States and
any destination point in the world. 102 Finally, the definition states that it includes
“any and all means.” 103 The activities component has revealed itself to be the most
problematic in recent years due to the use of the word “money.” While the term

96. See IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018) (no exception for incidental transmitters).
97. Brad Stone, The $99 Billion Idea: How Uber and Airbnb Fought City Hall, Won Over the People,
Outlasted Rivals, and Figured Out the Sharing Economy, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-uber-airbnb-99-billion-idea/ (“Airbnb and Uber . . . are among the fastest-growing
startups in history by sales, market value, and number of employees.”).
98. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2903(1) (2018) (only entities engaged in the business of money transmission or engaged in the sale or issuance of prepaid payment mechanisms are required to be licensed
under the Act).
99. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018).
100. Id. Payment instruments means “any check, draft, money order, traveler’s check or other
instrument or written order for the transmission of payment of money, sold or issued . . . [but] does not
include any credit card voucher, any letter of credit or any instrument which is redeemable by the issuer in
goods or services.” IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(13) (2018).
101. IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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“money” is not defined in the Act, 104 the Idaho Department of Finance considers
only fiat currencies and not virtual currencies to be “money.” 105
Another key definition limiting the scope of the Idaho Act is the definition of
“person,” which delimits the entities that the Act considers. 106 The Act is currently
limited in its applicability to traditional entities, such as individuals and partnerships. 107 The Act’s constrained entity conceptualization embodied in its current definition of “person” frames all other aspects of the Act, such as who or what controls
the transmitter and who or what is performing the executive functions of the transmitter. 108
ii. License Requirements
The current Act requires all entities engaged in an activity covered by the
Idaho Act in Idaho to obtain an Idaho license. 109 This may be done through the use
of a common license application form filed through the Nationwide Multistate Licensing System & Registry (NMLS), which is accepted by multiple states, or by applying directly to the Idaho Department of Treasury. 110
The qualifications required to obtain and maintain a license are generally focused on ensuring the solvency and prudent business practices of applicants to protect consumers who might use their services. 111 These qualifications attempt to
achieve this goal by imposing minimum net worth and security requirements as direct financial collateral securing the customer funds with which they may be entrusted. 112 Additionally, if the entity issues payment instruments, it must “possess
permissible investments having an aggregate market value . . . of not less than the
104. See generally IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018).
105. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Flora, Fin. Exam’r, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on BitCoin Exchange Licensing
Requirement (Oct. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. October 2017 Letter], https://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Digital%20Currency/2017-10-11.pdf); E-mail from
Coleen Hodson, Supervising Investigator, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing of Virtual Currency Exchanger
(Nov. 08, 2017, 13:28 MST) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. November 2017 Letter], (https://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Digital%20Currency/2017-11-08.pdf).
106. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(15) (2018).
107. See id. (defining “person”); IDAHO CODE § 26-2903(1) (2018) (licensing requirement is limited
only to persons engaged in covered activities).
108. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(4) (2018) (the only entity the act recognizes that can control
a licensee is a “person”); IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(7) (2018) (executive officers are those with the title “and
any other person who performs similar functions” (emphasis added)).
109. IDAHO CODE § 26-2903 (2018). However, the Act carves out exclusions for three types of entities: state and federal government entities, banks, and authorized representatives of licensees. IDAHO CODE
§ 26-2904 (2018).
110. See States Expand Use of NMLS to New Industries, NATIONWIDE MULTISTATE LICENSING SYS. &
REGISTRY (last updated Jan. 1, 2018), https://nationwidelicensingsystem.org/searchcenter/pages/results.aspx?k=expansion%20tracking (spreadsheet identifying the States that accept the common license applications through the NMLS, including Idaho); Idaho Money Transmitter Section, supra note 14 (providing
a license application form for money transmitters not wishing to use the NMLS system).
111. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2910(1) (2018) (the applicant’s “financial condition and responsibility, financial and business experience, character and general fitness” are investigated).
112. IDAHO CODE § 26-2905(1) (2018) (minimum net worth requirements for licensees); IDAHO CODE
§ 26-2908(1) (2018) (security device requirement of at least $10,000).
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aggregate face amount of all outstanding payment instruments issued or sold by
the licensee in the United States.” 113 Furthermore, an investigation of the entity
itself is performed which, if so desired by the Department of Treasury, may be an
on-site investigation “the actual cost of which shall be borne by the applicant.” 114
Once a license has been granted, the licensee must comply with annual and
event-based reporting requirements to maintain the license. The primary reporting
requirement is an annual report to the Idaho Department of Treasury containing,
among other information, extensive financial information. 115 Furthermore, upon
the occurrence of certain events, such as revocation of a transmitter license by another state or an officer of the licensee being convicted of a felony, the event must
be reported to the Idaho Department of Treasury within fifteen days. 116 Failing to
comply with these reporting or financial requirements or being found as conducting
“business in an unsafe or unsound manner” can lead to the suspension or revocation of an entity’s license. 117
A licensee utilizing authorized representatives must meet more stringent
qualifications to obtain a license. 118 In addition to the base net worth requirements,
the licensee must maintain an additional $25,000 in net worth for each authorized
representative. 119 Further, each authorized agent must be authorized by express
written contract with the licensee. 120 Moreover, the licensee must ensure that the
authorized representative complies with certain reporting, 121 further adding to the
cost of using authorized representatives.
The sum of these requirements is that they impose a high barrier to entry for
those seeking to provide money transmission services or issue payment instruments in Idaho—a barrier that is not necessarily correlated to the actual risk of loss
to consumers. The current Idaho Act sacrifices innovation for security. While such a
sacrifice may seem to create only a marginal burden on innovation at the micro
level, a macro level examination of the Act in light of the larger regulatory landscape
reveals the significant regulatory burden to which the Act contributes.
B. Entities Covered by the Current Act
While the express wording of the Idaho Act would seem to make it clear who
must be licensed, the Act is both more and less inclusive than it first appears. The
traditional money transmitters, such as money remitters and money order issuers,
easily fall within the scope of the Act. 122 Furthermore, since the definition of

113. IDAHO CODE § 26-2906 (2018). “Permissible investments” is a defined term in the Idaho Act
and includes, among other things, cash, investments securities which are obligations of the United States,
and stocks. IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(14) (2018).
114. IDAHO CODE § 26-2910(1) (2018).
115. IDAHO CODE § 26-2911(1) (2018).
116. IDAHO CODE § 26-2912 (2018).
117. IDAHO CODE § 26-2917(4) (2018).
118. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2918 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 26-2905(1) (2018).
119. IDAHO CODE § 26-2905(1) (2018).
120. IDAHO CODE § 26-2918 (2018).
121. IDAHO CODE § 26-2919(5) (2018).
122. Idaho Money Transmitters Section, supra note 14.
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“money transmission” explicitly includes the sale of payment instruments, 123 issuers of stored value cards like prepaid gift cards are included. 124 The Act has also
been extended to apply to “virtual currency exchangers,” which are entities that act
as an intermediary to exchange virtual currencies for legal tender. 125 Moreover, the
current Act has been found to apply to payment processors and payroll processors,
even when they are only paying out virtual currency. 126
However, the Idaho Department of Treasury has clearly stated that only exchangers of virtual currencies are regulated. 127 Those who deal exclusively in virtual
currency or who exchange virtual currency from their own supply for fiat currencies
do not require a license under the current Act. 128 It is only when, by design or in
practice, an entity acts like an intermediary between two other parties to exchange
fiat legal tender for virtual currency that the entity will be required to obtain a license. 129 The Idaho Department of Treasury has indicated that this is likely to occur
in practice when an entity buys virtual currency on the open market and sells it for
legal tender at a sufficient volume to effectively be acting like an intermediary between the person from whom they bought the virtual currency and the person to
whom they sold it, even though those two parties were not otherwise connected
nor had any intention of being so. 130 This position is somewhat incongruent with
the Department of Treasury’s stance on payroll processors who receive fiat currency and pay employees virtual currency from their own inventory. 131 The Department has indicated that, even in this scenario, the payroll processor needs to be
licensed under the Act. 132
In addition, incidental transmitters, like bill pay aggregators, potentially fall
within the scope of the Act. 133 While these types of entities would seem to clearly
fall within the payment processors category, one opinion letter from the Idaho Department of Treasury indicates that certain types of bill pay aggregators may not be
123. IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018).
124. Idaho Money Transmitters Section, supra note 14.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see Dep’t Fin. November 2017 Letter, supra note 105. The inclusion of payment processors runs counter to FinCEN who excludes payment processors, including online marketplaces. See FINCEN,
APPLICATION OF MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS REGULATIONS TO A COMPANY ACTING AS AN INDEPENDENT SALES ORGANIZATION
AND PAYMENT PROCESSOR, FIN-2014-R009 (Aug. 27, 2014), https://perma.cc/B59W-QJE3 [hereinafter FINCEN
RULING 2014-R009] (exclusion of payment processors); FINCEN, FINCEN RULING 2003-8 – DEFINITION OF A MONEY
TRANSMITTER (MERCHANT PAYMENT PROCESSOR) (Nov. 19, 2003), https://perma.cc/5ZDK-6TQL [hereinafter
FINCEN RULING 2003-8] (extending payment process exception to online marketplaces). Further, Idaho has
failed to include an agent-of-the-payee exemption. See IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018); Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 129.
127. Dep’t Fin. November 2017 Letter, supra note 105.
128. Id.
129. See id.; Dep’t Fin. October 2017 Letter, supra note 105.
130. See Dep’t Fin. October 2017 Letter, supra note 105.
131. Id. (stating that the Idaho Department of Treasury requires all payroll processors to obtain a
license when responding to an inquiry from an entity that was planning on paying out virtual currencies in
its payroll processing capacity, potentially from its own inventory).
132. See id.
133. See id. These are entities that collect together all of a person’s bills, collects money from that
person, and uses that money to pay the bills on the person’s behalf.
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required to obtain a license. 134 The Department stated in a letter on January 28,
2016 that credit counselors licensed under the Idaho Collection Agency Act who
collected money from their clients and used it to make remittances on the client’s
behalf to the client’s creditors, would not need to obtain a money transmitter license. 135 The Department limited this exception to those remittances made on behalf of clients that were “solely incidental to their credit counselor activities.” 136
However, this leniency runs directly counter to the Department’s prior stance on
the issue. 137
VI. ADVANTAGEOUS PROVISIONS IN THE LAWS OF OTHER STATES, THE UNIFORM
ACT, AND FEDERAL LAW
A. Advantageous Money Transmitter Regulation Provisions in Other States
Many states have a similar set of basic provisions in their money transmitter
regulations. 138 The provisions that Idaho has in common with many other states
include the exclusion of “state and federally chartered depository financial institutions” from regulation, 139 no reciprocity with licensing requirements, 140 bond requirements, 141 and minimum valuations for licensees. 142
However, other states have seemingly advantageous provisions that are missing from the Idaho Act. One such advantageous provision used by several states is
an agent-of-the-payee exemption. 143 This exemption is “meant to exempt businesses that adequately mitigate . . . legislative concerns.” 144 It exempts “transaction[s] in which the recipient of the money or other monetary value is an agent of
the payee pursuant to a preexisting written contract and delivery of the money or
other monetary value to the agent satisfies the payor’s obligation to the payee.” 145
The transmitters in such transactions present a very low risk to consumers using
134. See Letter from Jim Burns, Sec. Bureau Chief, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing Requirements
for Entities with Licenses Under the Idaho Collection Agency Act (Jan. 28, 2016) (https://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Licensing%20No-Action/2016-01-28.pdf) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. January 2016 Letter].
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Letter from James A. Burns, Investigations Chief, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing Requirements for Entities with Licenses Under the Idaho Collection Agency Act (May 2, 2011) (https://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Misc/2011-05-02.pdf) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. May
2011 Letter] (holding that entities licensed under the Idaho Collection Agency Act must obtain a license
under the Idaho Money Transmitters Act).
138. See generally 50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 27.
139. Judith Rinearson & Kristine M. Andreassen, Developments in the Regulation of Prepaid Payment Products Under State Money Transmitter Licensing Laws, 65 BUS. L. 271, 272 (2009); see IDAHO CODE §
26-2904 (2018).
140. See 50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 27 (the vast majority of states do not have any reciprocity);
IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2901–2928 (2018) (no reciprocity exemption to licensing requirement).
141. See 50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 27 (almost every state that regulates money transmitters has
a bond requirement).
142. See id.
143. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 129.
144. Id.
145. CAL. FIN. CODE § 2010(l) (West 2018); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.020(9)(c) (West
2018).
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their services because a consumer’s obligation to pay is discharged when the consumer provides the money to the transmitter. 146 Such transmitters do not implicate
the consumer protection policies underlying the Idaho Act because licensing them
does not further protect the consumer.
Another provision used by other states and missing from the Idaho Act is the
exclusion of certain payment processors, 147 who are also excluded under federal
regulation when certain criteria are met. 148 Certain types of payment processors
pose a low risk with respect to both consumers and anti-money laundering concerns. This is especially true for those whose payment processing activities are incidental to their core business, such as AirBnB and Amazon, because such entities are
generally transmitting money between “BSA-approved institutions over well-regulated clearing and settlement networks, arguably mitigating anti-money laundering
and safety-and-soundness concerns.” 149 Moreover, where these entities explicitly
adopt the obligation of the consumer to pay their creditors upon accepting the consumer’s funds, the risk is decreased further.
An additional provision contained in many other states’ money transmitter
regulations is one allowing for the modification of monetary licensing requirements. 150 For example, the state of Washington allows the director of its Department of Treasury to determine the net worth requirements for money transmitters,
with a statutory minimum of $10,000 and a statutory maximum of $3 million. 151
This provision allows for some of the monetary licensing requirements to be tied to
the risk of loss to consumers that a given entity represents. Tying the licensing requirements to risk helps alleviate the regulatory burden on entities whose regulation under the default rules would not advance the purposes of imposing such regulation—protecting citizens from financial loss due to fraudulent or from unsound
business practices in the state of Idaho.
As another example, Texas has enacted two similar requirement modification
provisions pertaining to net worth and permissible investment requirements. 152 Under Texas Financial Code Section 151.307(b), the Texas Banking Commissioner has
the power to modify the net worth requirement for an applicant based on the following ten factors:
(1) the nature and volume of the projected or established business; (2) the
number of locations at or through which money transmission is or will be
conducted; (3) the amount, nature, quality, and liquidity of its assets; (4)
the amount and nature of its liabilities; (5) the history of its operations and

2018).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 2010(l) (West 2018).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.020(9)(a) (West 2018).
See FINCEN RULING 2014-R009, supra note 126.
Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 128.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.060 (West 2018); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.307 (West

151. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.060 (West 2018).
152. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.307(b) (West 2018) (related to net worth requirement); TEX. FIN.
CODE ANN. § 151.309(a) (West 2018) (related to permissible investment requirement).
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prospects for earning and retaining income; (6) the quality of its operations; (7) the quality of its management; (8) the nature and quality of its
principals and persons in control; (9) the history of its compliance with applicable state and federal law; and (10) any other factor the commissioner
considers relevant. 153
Under Texas Financial Code Section 151.309(a), the value of the permissible
investments required to be maintained by a licensee depends on the net worth of
the licensee. 154 If the licensee’s net worth is less than $5 million, then the aggregate
market value of the licensee’s permissible investments must be at least equal to
“the aggregate face amount of the license holder’s average outstanding money
transmission obligations.” 155 If the licensee’s net worth is at least $5 million, then
the aggregate market value of the licensee’s permissible investments need only be
one half of the aggregate face amount of the licensee’s average outstanding money
transmission obligations. 156 Both provisions are an attempt to tie the regulatory
burden to the risk of loss to consumers posed by a given transmitter. The net worth
modification provision attempts to do this by identifying concrete factors for determining the risk posed by a given entity. The permissible investment requirement
provision attempts to do this by reducing one monetary requirement when another
mean of repaying consumers in the event of loss is available. Both provisions manifest the Texas legislature’s recognition that the purposes underlying money transmitter regulation may be better served when the regulatory burden can be modified based on a licensee’s unique circumstances.
B. Advantageous Provisions of the Uniform Money Services Act
The Uniform Money Services Act (“UMSA”) represents one effort to provide a
cohesive framework for the regulation of money transmitters and other non-depository providers of financial services. 157 Ten states and two U.S. territories have enacted versions of the UMSA. 158 The UMSA has four notable advantageous provisions related to the regulation of money transmitters that are worth discussing: a
reciprocity provision, 159 a more expansive definition of money transmission, 160 a
provision allowing for the modification of license monetary requirements, 161 and
separate licensing provisions for different money service businesses. 162
153. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §151.307(b) (West 2018).
154. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §151.309(a) (West 2018).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED ACT 6 (1997) (though the act is focused
on the prevention of money laundering, uniformity in licensing is the means by which this goal is sought).
158. See Money Services Act, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome?CommunityKey=cf8b649a-114c-4bc9-8937-c4ee17148a1b (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (map indicating the states and territories that have enacted the Uniform Act).
159. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 201(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
160. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102(14) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
161. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 204(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
162. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 201 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004) (money transmitters); UNIF. MONEY
SERVS. ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004) (check cashers); UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 401 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2004) (currency exchangers).
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The most notable of these provisions is the licensing reciprocity provision. This
provision allows an entity licensed to operate as a money transmitter in one state
to operate in another state without obtaining another license. 163 Under the UMSA,
the transmitter must register with the state, 164 the state will conduct an investigation into the soundness of the transmitter, 165 and the transmitter must comply with
reporting and permissible investment requirements of the state as if it had been
licensed by the state. 166 This reciprocity scheme simplifies the process and reduces
the cost and regulatory burden for a money transmitter expanding its service offerings to other states. 167 The scheme also serves the consumer protection purposes
underlying such regulation in two ways. First, these money transmitters are still investigated and tracked by the relevant state agency though the initial investigation
and continuous reporting requirements. 168 Second, by lowering the burden of operating legally within the state, entities that may have otherwise not have applied
for a license may be more inclined do so, increasing the visibility of such entities to
regulatory authorities.
The next most notable provision is the UMSA’s definition of “money transmission,” 169 which is both more and less inclusive than the definition found in the Idaho
Act. The definition is more inclusive because “money transmission” is defined to
include transmission of “monetary value.” 170 The definition is less inclusive since it
explicitly excludes “the provision solely of delivery, online or telecommunications
services, or network access” and “clearing agents.” 171
The inclusion of transmission of “monetary value” in the UMSA’s definition of
“money transmission” allows the UMSA to cover transmitters of non-traditional
mediums of exchange, including mediums like virtual currency. 172 “Monetary value”
is a flexible term meant to allow the UMSA to encompass new and alternative mediums of exchange. 173 The definition is meant to include only those mediums that
are “accepted by a community[] larger than the two parties to the exchange.” 174
Under this definition, regulators have the discretion to determine when a medium
is of sufficient size to fall within the scope of the regulations. 175 The flexibility of the
163. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 201(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004); UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
164. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
165. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
166. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004); see UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 701(a)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004) (licensee must have “permissible investments that have a market value . . . of not
less than the aggregate amount of all its outstanding payment instruments and stored value obligations . . .
and money transmitted from all states”).
167. The principal cost reduction comes from the removal of redundant and non-overlapping security requirements.
168. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
169. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102(14) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
170. Id.
171. Id.; UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102 cmt. 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
172. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102(11) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004) (defining “Monetary value”).
173. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102 cmt. 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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definition allows regulators to respond to non-traditional mediums of exchange
without needing to amend the law or stretch an existing definition beyond its intended scope. However, this flexibility can lead to differences in enforcement of
such regulations. For example, Texas, which has enacted a modified version of the
UMSA, does not regulate the transmission of virtual currencies, 176 although certain
virtual currencies, such as BitCoin, almost certainly fall within the definition of
“monetary value.” 177
Comment 9 to Section 102 of the Uniform Act explains that “entities that
simply transfer money between parties as clearing agents . . . fall outside the scope
[of the statute];” this section therefore potentially creates an implicit exemption for
certain incidental transmitters. 178 The comment contrasts “[i]nternet payment services that hold customer’s funds or monetary value for their own account” with
such services that “serve simply as a clearing agent.” 179 The former are included
within the definition of money transmission while the latter are not. 180 This exclusion appears to create an inherent exemption for incidental transmitters like online
marketplaces that merely serve as a clearing agent to ensure payments are made.
C. Federal Regulation of Money Transmitters
Federal regulation of money transmitters comes principally from the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), as enforced by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN),
and is principally focused on the discovery and prevention of money laundering and
fraud. 181 The BSA defines a money transmitter as “[a] person that provides money
transmission services.” 182 The BSA uses a broad definition of “money transmission
services,” defining it as “the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission . . . to another location
or person by any means.” 183 This broad definition, like the one used by the UMSA,
allows for transmitters of non-traditional stores of value, such as virtual currencies,
to be included within the BSA. 184 FinCEN has indicated that it will treat “convertible”
virtual currency like fiat currency for the purposes of defining money transmission. 185
176. See Charles G. Cooper, Regulatory Treatment of Virtual Currencies Under the Texas Money
Services Act (April 3, 2014), https://www.dob.texas.gov/public/uploads/files/consumer-information/sm1037.pdf.
177. The Uniform Law Commission has issued a separate act for the regulation of virtual currencies, but the UMSA is still applicable. See generally UNIF. REG. OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUS. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2017).
178. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102 cmt. 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 113–15; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2018).
182. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2018).
183. Id.
184. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 122.
185. Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual
Currencies, DEP’T TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf [hereinafter FinCEN Ruling 2013-G001]. “Convertible” virtual is defined as virtual currency that “either has an equivalent value in real currency, or acts as a substitute for real
currency.” Id.

2019

NEW ACTORS, NEW MONEY, NEW METHODS, SAME
BUSINESS: SALVAGING MONEY TRANSMITTER REGULATION
IN IDAHO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND BEYOND

363

Several exemptions exist at the federal level that limit the scope of federally
regulated entities. 186 Two noteworthy exemptions are the exemption for certain
payment processors and the exemption for entities whose money transmission activities are “integral to the provision of the Company’s service” but are not the service itself. 187 These provisions are noteworthy because they exempt entities that
present a low risk of engaging in money laundering. 188
In addition to the regulation under the BSA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has regulated certain prepaid payment mechanisms. 189 These
regulations affect certain money transmitters, like Venmo, that provide accounts
that store users’ money within their services in addition to issuers of more traditional prepaid payment mechanisms. 190 These regulations are focused principally
on protecting the consumers who use such services. 191
Furthermore, federal courts have determined that virtual currencies, like
Bitcoin, are “money” under various federal statutes. 192
VII. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT IDAHO ACT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Now that the relevant technology, statutory provisions, and policies have
been explained, the next step is to examine the problems arising from the interaction of these pieces. Based on these problems, this article then suggests solutions
to mitigate or resolve them.
A. Problems with the Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act
The issues with Idaho’s Money Transmitter Act can be attributed to three primary failings: (1) its failure to recognize any meaningful form of licensing reciprocity; (2) its failure to tie the degree of regulation to the degree of risk of loss to the
consumer; and (3) its failure to be sufficiently flexible in its applicability. These fail-

186. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 114.
187. See FINCEN RULING 2014-R009, supra note 126 (exclusion of payment processors). 31 C.F.R. §
1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(B) (2018) (excluding payment processors from definition of money transmission); 31
C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2018) (excluding those who transmit funds only integral to provision of the
entity’s services).
188. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 114.
189. See generally CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PREPAID RULE: SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_prepaid-small-entitycompliance-guide.pdf.
190. See id.; Gillian B. White, The New Rules of Digital Cash, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/cfpb-prepaid-venmo/503000/.
191. Gillian B. White, The New Rules of Digital Cash, ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/cfpb-prepaid-venmo/503000/.
192. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, at *21 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26,
2014). Federal courts have found that such currencies are money within the context of operating an unlicensed money transmission business. See United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United
States v. Mansy, No. 2:15-cr-198-GZS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71786 (D. Me. May 11, 2017) (adopting the reasoning set forth in Faiella to find that using virtual currency in the context of a money transmitting business
was transmission of “money”).
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ures pose the dual problems of stifling innovation and failing to keep up with innovative actors and activities involved in money transmission. The Idaho Act stifles
innovation principally through its failures to allow licensing reciprocity and to tie
the degree of regulation to the degree of risk of consumer loss. Further, the Idaho
Act’s rapidly aging conceptualizations are the result of the Act not being updated,
in combination with a lack of flexibility built into the Act, 193 the effects of which are
exacerbated by the exponential nature of technological development. 194
The first of these failures, the lack of any licensing reciprocity, 195 contributes
to the Balkanized regulatory morass that is the national regulatory landscape governing money transmitters. Idaho is not an outlier with respect to this failure; very
few states offer any reciprocity. 196 However, the Idaho Act’s failure to include any
reciprocity provisions contributes to the problem. Such Balkanization is problematic
because most states have their own bond requirements, application information,
and entity investigation requirements for money transmitters. 197 The cost and time
barriers created by these overlapping requirements can quickly exceed the capacity
of a start-up company seeking to provide money transmissions services in more
than a few states. 198 For example, if a company based in Idaho wanted to provide
money transmission services to Idaho and each state adjoining Idaho, the minimum
security amount would be $115,000. 199 If that company wanted to expand to California, it would be required to pay an additional $250,000 surety bond or security. 200 Any transmitter that does not already have a robust operation generating
strong revenue or significant capital investment would find such costs prohibitive.
This redundancy in requirements is an inefficient means of protecting consumers,
ultimately harming them by preventing innovative entities from reaching the market and encouraging new transmitters to evade regulation until they are large
193. The Director has some flexibility to waive requirements, such as those relating to permissible
investments and what information is required on the license application, but the Idaho Act is bound too
tightly by its statutory definitions and interpretation for such flexibility to be meaningful. IDAHO CODE § 262906 (2018) (director can waive permissible investment requirements in certain cases); IDAHO CODE § 262907(4) (2018) (power to waive requirement for information on application). But see IDAHO CODE § 262902(11) (2018) (definition of “money transmission” narrow relative to the Uniform Act and the definition
used for federal regulation); Dep’t Fin. October 2017 Letter, supra note 105 (treating virtual currency as not
within the scope of the Idaho Act).
194. See Mohammed Sanduk, Is the Technology a New Way of Thinking?, 38 J. TECH. STUD. 105,
110 (2012).
195. IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2903–2928 (2018) (not reciprocity exceptions); see e.g., Letter from James
A. Burn, Investigations Chief, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing of Entities Engaged in Money Transmission
with No Physical Presence in Idaho (Apr. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. April 2011 Letter], http://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Misc/2011-04-18.pdf; Letter from James A. Burn,
Investigations Chief, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing of Entities who Accept Fund Transfer Orders from
Idaho Residents via the Internet (Dec. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. December 2010 Letter],
http://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Misc/2010-12-15.pdf.
196. See 50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 27, at 4, 140 (noting that only Alaska and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have licensing reciprocity).
197. See generally id.
198. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 131–32.
199. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2908 (2018) (minimum security bond amount is $10,000); 50-STATE
SURVEY, supra note 27, at 74, 100, 116, 126, 136 (noting the various minimum-security amounts for NV, OR,
UT, WA, and WY. Montana does not regulate money transmitters).
200. 50-STATE SURVEY, supra note 27, at 15.
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enough to afford the costs of obtaining a license. 201 Idaho has seen examples of
such evasion already by transmitters who were licensed in other states. 202 In State
of Idaho v. Quickdinero, a money transmission business incorporated in Illinois and
licensed as a money transmitter in six states agreed to pay a $5,000 fine for engaging in money transmission in Idaho without a license. 203 The fact that an entity licensed in six other states failed to comply with Idaho’s licensing requirements is
indicative of the problematic regulatory landscape. While this issue is not isolated
to Idaho, the Idaho Act contributes to the problem. The rise of the internet, which
has enabled companies to offer their services nationally from the outset, has highlighted this reciprocity issue, but legislatures have been slow to respond.
The second major failure to the current Idaho Act is its failure to adequately
tie its degree of regulation to the degree of risk of loss to consumers presented by
a given transmitter. This lack of proportionate regulation prevents a regulatory response to new technologies’ ability to greatly decrease the risk of loss to consumers, 204 thereby diminishing the benefits realized from these technologies. The monetary and reporting requirements in the current Idaho Act are the source of this
failing. While the permissible investment requirement may be waived when “the
dollar volume of a licensee’s outstanding payment instruments does not exceed the
bond or other security devices posted by the licensee,” 205 currently the only other
modification to the monetary requirements that could be considered as a proxy for
risk of consumer loss is the number of locations or authorized representatives of
the licensee. 206 While this may have been a sufficient proxy measurement for such
risk when the number and dollar value of transactions a particular transmitter could
perform was limited by the number of physical locations, the rise of the internet
has rendered this proxy measurement obsolete. A transmitter is no longer limited
by physical location and may offer its services to every citizen in Idaho without being
physically present in the state at all. Moreover, the reporting requirement has no
option for modification, imposing its costly requirements on entities without any
attempt to match its regulatory burden to the risk presented by an entity. 207 These
requirements together create a relatively high barrier to entry in a state with a relatively small population. 208 Further, the effectiveness of reporting, surety bonds,
201. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 132–36.
202. See Agreement and Order 1-3, State of Idaho v. Quickdinero, No. 2005-12-1 (Idaho Dep’t of
Treasury May 20, 2005).
203. See id.
204. See generally Kamil Gregor, IBM Wants to Make 2017 the Year of Blockchain Enterprise Deployment
IDC
3–4,
6
(April
2017),
https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/in-en/assets/IDC_Report__IBM_wants_to_make_2017_the_year_of_BlockChain_Enterprise__Deployment.pdf
(discussing IBM’s use of blockchain technology in the resolution of financing disputes and providing the
technology to the Japan Exchange Group to reduce risk, costs, and trade settlement time in security trading).
205. IDAHO CODE § 26-2906 (2018).
206. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2905 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 26-2908 (2018).
207. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2911 (2018).
208. See UNITED STATES CENSUS, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED STATES,
REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2017 (2017), https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/popest/tables/2010-2017/state/totals/nst-est2017-01.xlsx (listing Idaho as the 39th most populous state as of 2017).
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and net worth requirements as consumer protection measures is debatable in the
current scheme. 209
The third major failing of the current Idaho Act, its lack of flexibility, has resulted in narrow conceptualizations of the actors and activities involved in money
transmission. These conceptualizations are rapidly antiquating with the exponential
progression of technology. The current Act’s conceptualization of the actors involved in money transmission that should be regulated has become both over and
under-inclusive. Further, the current Act’s conceptualization of what constitutes
money transmission grows more under-inclusive as alternative mediums of exchange increase in importance. Compared to the first two failings, which err on the
side of overprotection of the consumer, the net result of this third failing is to impede the policy of consumer protection underlying the Idaho Act.
The Idaho Act is over-inclusive, because it fails to carve out exclusions for
emergent entities that do not present the risks that the Act sought to mitigate. The
current Act only requires businesses who sell or issue payment instruments, or engage “in the business of receiving money for transmission or . . . transmitting
money” to be licensed. 210 The only exceptions are government entities, banks, and
authorized representatives of licensees. 211 The failure to exclude, or modify the requirements for, entities that present a low risk of loss to consumers, but whom the
drafters of the Act would be unlikely to consider to be regulatory targets, renders
the Act over-inclusive. Moreover, entities that only engage in money transmission
incidentally and payment processors dealing exclusively with well-regulated entities present sufficiently low risk of loss to consumers that they should be either
excluded from the scope of the Act or subject to a lesser degree of regulation. 212
For these reasons, both types of entities are excluded from federal regulation and
from some other states’ regulations. 213
Furthermore, the Idaho Act is under-inclusive because it does not clearly apply
to certain types of entities that would arguably be engaging in money transmission.
The current definition of money transmission does not clearly apply certain types
of new organizations, such as Distributed Autonomous Organizations (DAO), which
neither have the centralized control that the Idaho Act seems to envision nor are
clearly engaged in the business of transmitting money. 214 The first issue, the lack of
centralized control, means there may be no identifiable entity to seek a license. Instead, there is only a group of individuals whose only connection to each other is
209. Aaron Greenspan, Held Hostage: How the Banking Sector Has Distorted Financial Regulation
and Destroyed Technological Progress, HARV. U. 1, 12–16 (2011), https://works.bepress.com/aaron_greenspan/1/ (illustrating how licensing requirements have failed to protect consumers).
210. IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018).
211. IDAHO CODE § 26-2904 (2018).
212. “Well-regulated entities” means BSA approved financial institutions in this context. Federal
regulators realized that such entities were not necessary to be regulated and updated the BSA to clearly
exclude them. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services
Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585, 43593 (July 21, 2011) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).
213. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(C) (2017) (excluding payment processors from BSA regulation);
31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2017) (excluding incidental payment processors from BSA regulation); Fatal
Fragments, supra note 4, at 142 (noting that Illinois does not require third-party payment processors to be
licensed as money transmitters).
214. See IDAHO CODE §§ 26-2902(15), 26-2907–2911 (2018) (statutes imposing requirements presumably to be filled out by an individual or representative); IDAHO CODE § 26-2902 (2018) (defining “money
transmission” but not “business”).
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the set of self-executing contracts that constitute the DAO. It is an open question
who would be liable under Idaho Code Section 26-2921 for failing to obtain the license if a license were required. It is questionable whether it would be equitable to
hold those who implemented the smart contracts responsibly, especially in instances where they were not a party to those contracts. This issue of a centralized
management conceptualization is further complicated where all transactional data
is anonymized in such a manner that no one person has access to all of the information required to be reported under the current Act. Then there is a further question of whether a DAO is engaging in the business of money transmission at all. If
the DAO is set up such that it is merely the conduit through which people transmit
funds pursuant to smart contracts, and the only remuneration for the service retained by the DAO is a small fee to automatically pay the cost of using the public
blockchain on which it operates, it becomes difficult to fairly define the DAO as being in the business of money transmission. Note, however, that the calculus might
change if there were a third party that facilitated the fund exchange performed by
the DAO from whom the DAO collects a fee for arranging the exchange. Under that
circumstance, the DAO would arguably be a payment processor, and the Idaho Department of Finance has stated “that all payroll processors are money transmitters
and licensure is required.” 215
The limited conceptualization of the Act can be further demonstrated by taking the above DAO hypothetical a step further and considering how licensing requirements apply when an AI was responsible for the creation and operation of the
DAO. The current Act limits its conceptualization of the entities involved in money
transmission to “persons,” 216 which does not seem to contemplate AI or other electronic entities. 217
The other conceptual limitation inherent in the current Idaho Act relates to
restrictive conceptualization of money transmission activities. While it is understandable that the Act was not drafted in anticipation of the rise of virtual currencies, the Act’s failure to consider a broader definition of money has resulted in a
failure to regulate entities that are handling an increasingly important medium of
exchange for Idaho’s citizens. 218 In particular, the limited regulation of virtual currencies is allowing a quickly growing risk of loss for Idaho consumers to go unchecked. 219 The Idaho Department of Treasury does currently require “exchangers”
215. Dep’t Fin. November 2017 Letter, supra note 105
216. Its conceptualization is limited by framing all actions in terms of those performed by a “person” or “persons” as defined by the act. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(9) (2018) (only a “person” may
obtain a license under the Act).
217. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(15) (2018).
218. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018); IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(13) (2018); IDAHO CODE § 262902(14) (2018); Idaho Money Transmitters Section, supra note 14 (stating that only exchangers of virtual
currency are regulated money transmitters).
219. See Andrew Arnold, 30% of Millennials Would Rather Invest in Cryptocurrency: Here Are 3
Tips to Help You Do It Smarter, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2018, 8:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewarnold/2018/01/07/30-of-millennials-invest-in-cryptocurrency-here-are-3-tips-to-help-you-do-itsmarter/#21ef3b277861 (noting the large interest from younger demographics in investing in virtual currencies).
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of virtual currency, entities who exchange virtual currency for legal tender, to be
licensed. 220 However, the protection provided by this requirement is of limited
value because companies that exchange their own virtual currency for legal tender
are not required to be licensed. 221 Only those facilitating the exchange of virtual
currency for legal tender between two other parties need to be licensed. 222 This
creates a situation in which the Idaho Act provides no protection from nefarious
individuals and organizations using unregulated mechanisms to launder money and
defraud consumers. Such money laundering is already a prevalent issue with virtual
currencies. 223
Another issue arising from the limited activity conceptualization is that the Act
does not sufficiently consider risk factors arising from the computer systems, which
are ubiquitously utilized in money transmission. For example, if a money transmitter’s computer systems are hacked, resulting in all customer accounts being
drained, it is not required to report the event to the Department of Treasury until
its annual report is due. 224 The transmitter is required to report bankruptcy, revocation, or suspension of their license by another state, and a felony indictment or
conviction of a key officer within fifteen days of the event, 225 but not a hacking
event resulting in the loss of all its customers’ money. Furthermore, the reporting
requirements do not contain any requirement to provide information on the data
security measures being used by the transmitter. 226 With the increase in high-profile data breaches, it is critical that regulated entities provide some confirmation
that they are using best practices to protect their systems. In fact, one of the greatest vulnerabilities of blockchain-based virtual currencies is the consumer access
point—the digital wallet in which the customer stores the currency in the case of
virtual currencies. 227 It is easy to imagine a scenario in which a transmitter leverages
a blockchain-based system to securely transmit funds but, due to lackluster security
practices, the digital wallet that contain the client’s funds is compromised and the
currency is stolen before the customer can retrieve it.

220. Idaho Money Transmitters Section, supra note 14 (stating that only exchangers of virtual currency are regulated money transmitters).
221. Letter from Jeff Flora, Fin. Exam’r/Investigator, Idaho Dep’t of Fin., on Licensing of a Virtual
Currency Exchanger Selling its Own Stock of Virtual Currency (July 26, 2016) [hereinafter Dep’t Fin. July 2016
Letter],
http://www.finance.idaho.gov/MoneyTransmitter/Documents/NAOP/Digital%20Currency/20
16-07-26.pdf.
222. Id.
223. Dan Boylan, Military, Intelligence Agencies Alarmed by Surge in Bitcoin Value in ‘Dark Web’
Fight, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/aug/10/bitcoin-valuesurge-sign-of-criminal-activity/. See generally Bitcoin Virtual Currency: Unique Features Present Distinct
Challenges for Deterring Illicit Activity, FBI (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf.
224. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2912 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 26-2911 (2018); IDAHO CODE § 28-51-105
(2018) (requiring disclosure to Idaho AG and potentially affected Idaho residents).
225. IDAHO CODE § 26-2912 (2018).
226. See IDAHO CODE § 26-2911 (2018).
227. Madhvi Mavadiya, Blockchain, Bitcoin, and Ethereum Explained, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2017 9:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/madhvimavadiya/2017/08/22/blockchain-bitcoin-ethereum/3/#501f
80c8c9fc (explaining the that the underlying technology, the blockchain, is effectively impossible to compromise, so nefarious individuals target the end user instead).
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B. Proposed Solutions to the Problems with Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act
i. Removing All State Regulatory Authority Over Money Transmitters to the CFPB is
the Ideal Solution
The most efficient method of resolving the issues facing Idaho’s Money Transmitter Act, and for resolving the fractured regulatory landscape governing money
transmitters generally, would be to preempt all current state regulatory power over
money transmitters under the Commerce Clause. The CFPB is the appropriate federal agency to take on this regulatory function since its core function is “protecting
consumers in the financial marketplace,” 228 which is the policy reason underlying
money transmitter regulation in many states. 229 Moreover, the CFPB already regulates international remittance transfers, 230 and the electronic fund transfer regulations it enforces already preempt state law to the extent that the state law is inconsistent. 231 Further, the CFPB already regulates prepaid payment mechanisms for the
benefit of consumers, the issuers of which are currently licensed under state money
transmitter regulations. 232 The consumer protection focus of money transmitter licensing regulation combined with the CFPB’s existing regulatory scope, results in
the CFPB being the natural choice of agency in which to consolidate money transmitter licensing authority. Any state regulatory authority relating to anti-money
laundering would be removed to FinCEN since that organization already regulates
money transmitters for that purpose.
Beyond the natural fit of the CFPB as the central regulatory and licensing authority, there are several benefits to consolidating such authority generally. The
foremost benefit of such a change is that it would resolve the Balkanized regulatory
landscape by creating a single set of licensing requirements. This would lead to regulatory certainty because case law and advisory opinions would be nationally relevant. Further, it would allow for a more complex gradation of requirements. Moreover, it would consolidate information about money transmitters within a single
source. This would have the dual effect of promoting consumer protection and antimoney laundering goals. It would advance consumer protection by providing a single source of information for a consumer to check that a transmitter is licensed and

228. The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/thebureau/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
229. See, e.g., S.B. 1454, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 1994), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/292e36b3-fbdc-4ee2-84b6-372de9b4de58/?context=1000516 (identifying purpose in the Statement of Purpose); Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 117–18 (identifying the policy reasons underpinning
similar laws in five of the most populous states).
230. See 12 C.F.R. § 1005.30 (2018).
231. 15 U.S.C. § 1693q (2018); Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Virtual Uncertainty:
Developments in the Law of Electronic Payments and Financial Services, 69 BUS. L. 263, 270 (2013).
232. See Prepaid Rule: Small Entity Compliance Guide, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_prepaid-small-entitycompliance-guide.pdf (CFPB regulation of prepaid payment cards); Idaho Money Transmitter Section, supra
note 14 (issuers of stored value instruments are required to be licensed under the Idaho Act).
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by ensuring that the license is meaningful. 233 It would advance anti-money laundering goals by concentrating information needed to uncover illegal activity, making it
easier for FinCEN as the principal regulatory for preventing money laundering to do
its job. The prior point is especially true in the context of cryptocurrencies, where
identifying the parties involved requires obtaining as much data as possible to identify patterns. 234 Moreover, it would advance consumer protection and anti-money
laundering by encouraging legitimate entities to become licensed by lowering the
net regulatory burden, thereby allowing the CFPB and FinCEN to focus on the truly
nefarious entities. Lastly, consolidation would provide one entity to be held accountable for ensuring adequate regulation, thereby making issues of regulatory
enforcement easier to resolve.
It is unlikely that the states would willingly cede this authority, and thus it
would require federal preemption to achieve such centralized control. 235 However,
precedent for such federal preemption exists in the related area of financial securities regulation. Called “Blue Sky” laws, 236 each state passed its own laws to protect
consumers in their state from increasing levels of securities fraud. 237 However,
these laws were ineffective in protecting consumers due to several factors, including the inability of the laws to cross state lines. 238 As a result of the failure of the
laws at the state level, federal securities laws were enacted. 239 The explicit reasons
given for the enactment of these federal laws included “the fact that securities
transactions [were] carried out across state boundaries, are an important part of
interstate commerce, involve issuers engaged in interstate commerce, and [that
such transactions] affect the financing of activities in interstate commerce.” 240 Congress was also worried about “a race to the bottom” of State level regulation. 241 The
transition to federal law occurred gradually over time. 242 The initial federal act did
not preempt state laws, but rather supplemented them based on the reasoning that
the state laws remained useful. 243 However, in the 1980s federal preemption was
made explicit, and in the 1990s the scope of federal preemption was expanded. 244
Federal preemption of money transmitter regulation, particularly regulation
of transmitters operating interstate, could follow a similar path. In addition to efficiency justifications, preemption in this context is justified by many of the same
233. Cf. Greenspan, supra note 209, at 13–14 (enforcement of licensing requirements has been
sporadic or nonexistent in some states, rendering a money transmitter license in that state meaningless).
234. See John Bohannon, Why Criminals Can’t Hide Behind Bitcoin, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/why-criminals-cant-hide-behind-bitcoin.
235. See Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, 145−46 (noting that states would likely be resistant to
required reciprocity being thrust upon them and instead federal preemption would be required).
236. Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-blueskyhtm.html (last updated Oct. 14, 2014).
237. Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21–23 (1998).
238. Id. at 22–23.
239. Id. at 23.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 24.
242. Id. at 22–24.
243. Painter, supra note 237, at 25−26.
244. Id. at 29–31.
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reasons that federal preemption of the “Blue Sky” laws was justified. 245 The federal
government already supplements state regulation of money transmitters to advance anti-money laundering goals, 246 so expanding its regulatory goals to include
consumer protection would be possible. However, it is likely that such a federal
preemption for consumer protection and regulatory efficiency reasons would result
in an accelerated preemption timeline compared to the “Blue Sky” law timeline because the implementation of a federal law related to licensing would likely inherently, if not explicitly, preempt state-level licensing from the outset. This inherent
preemption would result from the likelihood that the continued existence of state
licensing schemes would frustrate at least the efficiency policy underlying the federal regulation, if not the consumer protection policy as well. 247
The CFPB’s own regulations could be based on the BSA, and its promulgation
by FinCEN, and existing state level regulation. In particular, the CFPB could use the
existing regulatory framework at the state level to create its own framework. The
CFPB could adopt the basic set of requirements currently used by states, including:
net worth, security, permissible investment, applicant information, and reporting
requirements. From there, these basic requirements could be modified and scaled
in a manner to match the degree of regulation to the degree of risk, like that discussed below in sub-section (b) of this section. In addition to a basic set of regulations, the CFPB could look to adopt advantageous provisions currently enacted only
in certain states, such as an agent-of-the-payee exemption 248 and a provision stating that digital actors are agents of their creators. 249 The CFPB could adopt the BSA’s
statutory definition of “money transmission services,” 250 the BSA’s statutory exclusion of incidental transmitters, 251 and FinCEN’s interpretations of the BSA provisions. 252 The CFPB could also look to the UMSA, including its broad definition of
245. The similar policy justification includes a worry about a race to the bottom of regulation. The
intentional modification of proposed regulations in California, which as an effort to create a friendly regulatory environment for the virtual currency transmitters that had left New York after the state enacted more
stringent regulation, demonstrates that this policy concern is not unfounded. See Fatal Fragments, supra
note 4, at 125–26.
246. One-hour Money Laundering, supra note 2, at 140 (discussing how federal punishment for
operation of money transmission business without the required state license(s) was an enhancement of,
and supplement to, state regulation).
247. Francis J. Facciolo & Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable: The Continuing Viability of
State Law Claims in the Face of Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 525, 531 (1995) (noting that “state action that ‘frustrates policies underlying federal regulation’” are preempted) (quoting Richard J. Pierce Jr., Regulation, Deregulation,
Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 629
(1985)).
248. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 2010(l) (West 2018); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 641(1) (McKinney 2018).
249. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 28-50-114(1) (2018).
250. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2017).
251. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(F) (2017).
252. Interpretations here refers to FinCEN’s administration rulings and other guidance it has issued. See, e.g., FinCEN, supra note 185 (“interpretive guidance [clarifying] the applicability of the regulations
implementing the Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”).
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“money transmission” and “monetary value,” to ensure that virtual currency transmitters fall within its regulatory scope.
ii. Proposed Changes to Idaho’s Money Transmitters Act
In the absence of federal preemption of state licensing and regulatory authority, several modifications to the Idaho Act would serve to help alleviate some of the
issues that currently exist. The proposed changes are grouped into two categories
based on the two overarching issues that they address: (1) those alleviating burdens
on innovation, and (2) those recalibrating the Act’s conceptualization of the actors
and activities involved in money transmission. These changes would work together
to advance the consumer protection policy underlying the Idaho Act while minimizing the regulatory burdens that transmitters face. The difficulty in balancing these
two competing interests has caused issues for other states. 253 Therefore, Idaho
must proceed carefully. A telling example of the difficulty in achieving the appropriate balance comes from New York’s implementation of its virtual currency regulation. New York implemented a very broad definition of the activities that brought
an entity within the scope of their virtual currency transmitter regulation. 254 As a
result of the overly broad definition, some virtual currency business ended up leaving New York and terminating services in the state. 255
a. Suggested Changes to Alleviate Existing Burdens on Innovation
The first category of suggested changes, those designed to alleviate burdens
on innovation, is comprised of two types of changes: licensing reciprocity and requirement scaling.
Two levels of licensing reciprocity should be added to the Act: interstate licensing reciprocity and intra-state licensing reciprocity. Interstate licensing reciprocity would entail adding provisions recognizing an entity’s license granted by another state subject to certain conditions. Section 203 of the Uniform Act states requirements that should be sufficient to allow Idaho to ensure that consumers remain protected, while at the same time reducing the regulatory redundancy that
currently exists. Section 203 provides that only licenses from states that have substantially similar licensing requirements will be recognized, 256 allows for an investigation of the applicant by Idaho’s regulatory agency 257 and requires that the applicant comply with Idaho’s examination and reporting requirements as if it were licensed by Idaho. 258 However, the Section 203 provision that would require compliance with Idaho’s permissible investment requirements should not be used. 259 In
253. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 136.
254. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 125 (defining regulated activity as “storing, holding, or
maintaining custody or control of virtual currency on behalf of others” and “controlling, administering, or
issuing a virtual currency” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(q)(2)−(5) (2016)).
255. Id.
256. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
257. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
258. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 203(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
259. See id. (requiring that entities licensed in another state comply with Article 7, which describes
permissible investment requirements). This suggestion is predicated on the goal of eliminating redundant
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addition to its other inherent benefits, interstate licensing reciprocity would make
it more appealing for new and innovative prepaid payment mechanism providers
to offer their services in Idaho. With the rising importance of prepaid payment
mechanisms, 260 innovative offerings of such financial services are potentially a significant value to Idaho consumers.
The second level of licensing reciprocity should be intrastate licensing reciprocity. The Idaho Department of Treasury has already demonstrated a willingness
to allow entities licensed under other Acts that the Department administers to
forego obtaining a license under the Money Transmitter Act in certain cases. 261
Building on this willingness, language should be added to the Idaho Act explicitly
providing that licenses granted under other acts by Idaho are sufficient; at least
when the money transmission activity directly relates to the activities for which an
entity has a license and when the additional risk of loss to the consumer is minimal.
The reasoning for such intrastate reciprocity is particularly compelling in situations
where the other Act’s licensing requirements are substantially similar to the licensing requirements in the Idaho Money Transmitter Act. 262
The next type of suggestion under this category is license requirement scaling
based on the risk presented by the applicant/licensee. Two kinds of provisions in
the current Idaho Act present opportunities for scaling: monetary requirements and
reporting requirements. The method of scaling is similar for both. Statutory provisions should lay out criteria by which the risk presented by a given entity is measured and the baselines from which the requirements are increased or decreased.
Other states, such as Texas, have already identified factors that could be used to
make such assessments. 263 Idaho could leverage the work done by other states to
assemble its own list based on how effective states have found each of their criteria
to be. The baselines should be set based on similar criteria to those used in the risk
assessments, but the criteria should be objective, such as whether the applicant will
have a physical location in Idaho, the number of other states in which the applicant
is licensed, the value of surety bonds and other securities that applicant has with
other states, how long the applicant has provided money transmission services, the
magnitude of the applicant’s activities, and the value of the applicant’s net assets.

regulatory burdens. The purpose served by this provision in the Uniform Act, the protection of consumers
in the event that a money transmitter becomes unable to repay its obligations to them, is generally otherwise served by the same or similar requirements in the licensing state.
260. One-hour Money Laundering, supra note 2, at 178. (“[P]repaid cards have emerged as a
means of delivering financial services to a large segment of the population that is either not served or underserved by traditional banks.”).
261. Dep’t Fin. January 2016 Letter, supra note 134.
262. For example, the Idaho Collection Agency Act requires much of the same information and a
bond requirement to obtain a license under that Act, much like the Money Transmitters Act. Compare IDAHO
CODE § 26-2224 (2018) (requiring application information for licensing under the Idaho Collection Agency
Act) and IDAHO CODE § 26-2232 (2018) (requiring bond to be licensed under the Idaho Collection Agency Act),
with IDAHO CODE § 26-2907 (2018) (requiring information to apply for licensure under the Money Transmitter
Act) and IDAHO CODE § 26-2908 (2018) (requiring bond to obtain a license under the Money Transmitter Act).
263. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.307 (West 2018).
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For example, a money transmitter using a blockchain-based financial records system presents a lower risk than one that does not, since such a system makes it almost impossible for an employee of that transmitter to modify the transaction history. 264 Thus, unless the entire business were involved in the fraud, the transmitter
would be well-positioned to discover an employee’s fraud quickly, thereby decreasing the risk that a given customer will be defrauded by an employee of the transmitter. However, the minimum baseline for the monetary requirements should be
set sufficiently high to ensure that a licensee always has sufficient resources available to pay back any money entrusted to it by consumers, and a percentage of that
amount should be liquid.
This scaling should apply to the net worth requirements under Section 262905(1), the bond requirements under Section 26-2908, and the permissible investment requirements under Section 26-2906. Texas has a rudimentary form of this
scaling for its permissible investment requirement, decreasing the requirement permissible investment value when the licensee’s net worth reached $5 million or
more. 265
This scaling should also apply to the reporting requirements and information
requirements set forth in Section 26-2907, describing the information that must be
provided on the license application and Section 26-2911, describing annual reporting requirements. Based on the identified criteria, the initial information required
of an applicant and ongoing reporting requirements, including frequency of reporting, should be modified. Further, a process by which a licensee/applicant can appeal
the requirements found applicable to them should be set forth. The goal of such a
process should be to avoid litigation over any risk determinations made. This scaling
would fundamentally enable at least some regulation of anonymized decentralized
transmitters.
Finally, a provision allowing the director to temporarily waive monetary and
reporting requirements should be added. As another writer described it, such a
waiver provision “would offer time-delimited, carefully-tailored indemnities for ‘deserving’ business. Whether or not a business deserves temporary relief from licensure depends on the stated goals of the state’s money transmitter laws, with specific criteria for such a waiver left to the commissioner’s discretion.” 266 This waiver,
primarily targeted at startups, has become necessary in an age when small companies have the capacity to offer innovative services to the entire world immediately
via the internet. Idaho should seek to encourage such entities to obtain the appropriate licensing by shifting the cost/benefit analysis in favor of doing so for legitimate transmitters.

264. Jun Dai et al., Why Blockchain Has the Potential to Serve as a Secure Accounting Information
System, CPA J. (Sept. 2017), https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/09/20/blockchain-potential-serve-secureaccounting-information-system-cpe-season/ (“These characteristics allow blockchain to serve as the foundation of a new accounting information system that prevents accounting records or related electronic documents from being altered or deleted.”).
265. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.309(a) (West 2018).
266. Fatal Fragments, supra note 4, at 144.
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b. Suggested Changes to Adjust the Idaho Act’s Conceptualization of Money
Transmission Actors and Activities
The second category of suggested changes is focused on adjusting the Idaho
Act’s conceptualization of the actors and activities involved in money transmission
and targeting regulations toward the entities and activities that present a meaningful degree of risk. These changes are intended to provide more flexibility in regulatory enforcement.
The first type of change suggested under this category is the inclusion of certain exemptions. First, the agent-of-the-payee exemption is necessary because
many incidental transmitters fall within the scope of the current Idaho Act even
though they do not present a significant risk of consumer loss. 267 “Incidental transmission businesses with access to [these exemptions] can agree to assume consumer obligations,” thereby presenting a very low risk to consumers. 268 The risk of
loss presented by such an entity to consumers is so low that the regulatory burden
imposed by requiring the entity be licensed significantly outweighs such risk, even
when the licensing requirements are set to their lowest level under the requirement
gradation scheme proposed above. This exemption would also exclude certain payment processors, like Square. 269 Second, the Act should exempt transmitters that
are merely acting as a clearing agent. These transmitters are excluded from the
scope of the UMSA. 270 The comments following Section 102 of the UMSA state that
such entities are sufficiently low risk that they need not be included within the
scope of a customer protection statute. 271 These clearing agents are more common
with the rise of internet marketplaces, and justification for the regulation under the
money transmitter regulations is lacking.
The next change proposed under this second category is for Idaho to expand
its definition of “money transmission” to include “monetary value” and to adopt
the definition of “monetary value” used by the UMSA. 272 The primary difference
between the current definition of “money transmission” contained in the Idaho Act
and the definition in the UMSA is the UMSA’s inclusion of “monetary value” in the
definition. 273 This difference limits the flexibility of the Idaho Act to apply to transmitters that convey currency-like substitutes, and the rise of virtual currencies has
demonstrated why this limitation has become problematic. Expanding the definition of “money transmission” alone is not sufficient; the newly included term,
“monetary value,” must be defined to ensure that it encompasses the appropriate
267. Id. at 129.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 142 (discussing Illinois’ exclusion of payment processors like Square over concerns
about limiting innovation as a step toward a full-fledged agent-of-the-payee exemption).
270. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102 cmt. 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
271. Id.
272. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102(11) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004). In addition to adopting the definition of “monetary value” contained in the Uniform Act, the comments associated with the definition
should also be adopted.
273. Compare IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (2018), with UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102(14) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2004).
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forms of value. To that end, the UMSA’s definition of “monetary value” set forth in
Section 102(11), along with the associated Comment 10 following Section 102, provides an appropriately broad definition by which the important forms of value currently popular, like virtual currencies, would be covered as well as forms that may
emerge in the future. The definition in Section 102(11) is very broad, but the associated comments clarify that the “mediums of exchange” included within the definition are those accepted by the larger community. 274 Specific exemptions could be
added based on legislative priorities, but it is easier to add specific exemptions than
specific inclusions. Adopting sufficiently broad definitions would provide the Idaho
Act much-needed flexibility to ensure that Idaho consumers are protected. 275
The next type of proposed change relates to the recognition that most business activity is performed digitally, and the risks created by this are different from
those envisioned in the pre-internet proliferation era of the Idaho Act’s enactment.
The simplest proposed change is that, in addition to current annual reporting requirements under Section 26-2911, a computer system security audit should be
provided by the transmitter as well. 276 This requirement would help ensure that one
of the largest risks to consumers in this area, a transmitter being hacked and consumer funds being stolen or destroyed, is minimized. Such a reporting requirement
might also provide the statutory foundation for validating the algorithms controlling
a transmitter’s blockchain. The consumer protection policy underlying the Idaho Act
cannot be adequately advanced by financial audit reporting alone. In the digital age,
good computer security practices play an integral role in protecting consumers, and
the failure of a financial services business to engage in appropriate computer security practices is the type of unsound business practice from which the Idaho Act was
seemingly designed to protect consumers. Like providing audited financial reports,
this requirement would impose a heavy burden, but that burden has become a necessary one in the digital age. 277 Moreover, ensuring that a transmitter is following
appropriate computer security principles would facilitate the protection of records
that may be required in an examination under Section 26-2914. Finally, two additional requirements naturally flow from this change: (1) the inclusion of a computer
system security audit in the initial application information required by Section 262907; and (2) the addition of another extraordinary reporting requirement under
Section 26-2912, requiring a report in the event the licensee’s computer systems
are compromised resulting in consumer’s funds being lost. The requirement scaling
suggested above would apply to the proposed computer system security audit reporting and applicant information requirements.
274. See UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 102 cmt. 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).
275. Alternatively, Idaho could seek to enact a separate Act for the regulation of other stores of
value. For virtual currency, Idaho could look to enacting something similar to the Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act, created by the Uniform Law Commission. However, that would only resolve the issue
for virtual currency and does not future-proof the Idaho Act against new mediums of exchange not yet
envisioned and falling outside the scope of any kind of virtual currency regulation.
276. A computer system security audit here is meant to include an audit validating the security of
any computer code used in proprietary applications, computer network security, and computer security
practices (i.e., social engineering prevention, physical security practices, etc.).
277. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2 (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm#_ednref1 (noting that disclosure
of cybersecurity risks is required in certain cases to register to make a securities offering).
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The final change proposed by this article is for the Idaho Act to adopt the electronic agent paradigm as a stopgap measure while the legal and ethical fields regarding artificial intelligences develop. Due to advancements in AI, in the near future humans may be far removed from the creation and operation of money transmitters. 278 However, since we are in the infancy of AI development, attempting to
create more targeted regulation is likely to prove folly in hindsight. So instead, this
article merely suggests a paradigm under which the actions of an electronic entity
are treated as the actions of the electronic entity’s creator. Under this paradigm the
electronic entity is an agent of its creator. 279 This paradigm could be added to the
Idaho Act by expanding the definition of “person” to include “electronic agents,”
defining “electronic agents” as “digital or virtual entities, applications, programs, or
any other form of virtual actor who performs the creation, operation, and/or management functions of a money transmitter business normally performed by an individual,” 280 and specifying that electronic agents are agents of the non-digital entity that created them or their creator or their creator’s predecessor. Adopting such
a paradigm would allow for a responsible party to be identified if an AI attempts to
become licensed in Idaho. Further, such a paradigm would resolve the issue of who
is responsible for ensuring that an entity like a DAO has the appropriate licenses by
putting the onus on the person who created the smart contracts. However, as noted
above, this is merely meant to be a stopgap until the societal consensus regarding
the legal and ethical implications of AIs is determinable. As such, Idaho lawmakers
should be ready to update the law as necessary once such a determination is possible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The rapid technological progress in the two decades since the original enactment of Idaho’s Money Transmitter Act has brought about many beneficial changes,
including in the field of money transmission. It has never been easier or cheaper for
individuals to take advantage of money transmission services. However, this progress has resulted in changes that were completely unforeseen by those who originally drafted Idaho’s Money Transmitter Act, including the rise in importance of virtual currency, the explosion of internet-based markets and services providers, and
the proliferation of business entities that transmit money incidentally to their core
business. As a result, the current Idaho Act is both over and under-inclusive. Moreover, the sudden ease with which a money transmitter could offer its services in
every state due to the proliferation of the internet reveals how the Idaho Act contributes to a larger national regulatory problem.

278. See Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need
for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Market, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 449–51 (2015)
(discussing how artificial digital entities operating in the financial sector will eventually become independent
entities and rudimentary forms of AI already impact our life).
279. See IDAHO CODE § 28-50-114(1) (2018) (considering something very similar to this paradigm).
280. The proposed definition of “electronic agent” is meant to be an example. A more precise
definition is likely required to ensure that the definition encompasses the intended targets.
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In response to these unforeseen changes, this article proposes two principal
solutions: the consolidation of licensing and regulatory authority over money transmitters in a single federal entity, the CFPB, and changes to the existing Idaho’s
Money Transmitter Act. The most efficient solution to many of the problems facing
not only Idaho’s Act, but money transmitter regulations nationally, would be to consolidate authority within the CFPB. However, it is unlikely that such a transition will
occur, particularly in the near future. Thus, Idaho should move to implement the
changes suggested in this article to its regulations. Doing so would reduce the barriers to innovative money transmitter services reaching Idaho consumers, provide
better protection against fraudulent and unsound business practices for such consumers, and remove one regulatory bramble from the morass that is the national
money transmitter regulatory landscape.

